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Abstract
We formulate and study a general finite-horizon bargaining game with simultaneous
moves and a disagreement outcome that need not be the worst possible result for
the agents. Conditions are identified under which the game is dominance solvable
in the sense that iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies selects a unique
outcome. Our analysis uses a backward induction procedure to pinpoint the latest
moment at which a coalition can be found with both an incentive and the authority
to force one of the available alternatives. Iterative dominance then implies that the
alternative characterized in this way will be agreed upon at the outset — or, if a
suitable coalition is never found, that no agreement will be reached.
JEL classification codes: C78, D71, D74.
Keywords: backward induction, coalition, core, weak dominance.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and objectives
Since its early application to dynamic bargaining in the work of Stahl [24] and Rubin-
stein [20], game-theoretic modeling has led to a better understanding of the effects on
negotiated outcomes of voting rules, outside options, private information, and other such
factors. At the same time, however, a number of difficulties have arisen that cast doubt
upon the robustness and predictive power of results in this area.
Two such difficulties are relevant here. Firstly, the bargaining protocols used in most
theoretical and applied studies have at their heart an assumption of “temporal monopoly
[power]” that has never been adequately defended.1 And secondly, quite plausible models
of negotiation can turn out to possess large sets of equilibria that are not always readily
1For discussion and critiques of this assumption, see Kreps [14, pp. 563–565], Smith and Stacchetti [23],
and Simsek and Yildiz [22].
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pruned by any compelling selection criterion. For conciseness let us refer to these as the
“monopoly” and “multiplicity” problems, respectively.
In this paper we shall analyze a bargaining model that deals, to a limited extent, with
both of the problems just mentioned. To combat the monopoly problem, we shall posit a
simultaneous voting protocol that is symmetric among the participants and thus avoids
allocating bargaining power arbitrarily in the form of permission to commit or to delay
committing to an action. When similar “simultaneous-offer” games have been studied in
the past (e.g., by Nash [18] and Chatterjee and Samuelson [6]), the conclusion (e.g., of
Dekel [8, p. 301]) has been that they quickly run afoul of the multiplicity problem. But
this can be handled, we shall find, by using dominance solvability rather than any variety
of strategic equilibrium as our solution concept.
The combination of simultaneous moves and dominance analysis will allow us to work
with a model that is in several respects exceedingly general. Our setting will encompass
bargaining environments with any (finite) number of agents, an arbitrary (finite) set of
alternatives, time preferences subject only to weak regularity assumptions, and a variety
of different rules for reaching an agreement. The treatment of multilateral environments in
particular is noteworthy because these have been shown (e.g., by Sutton [25, pp. 721–723]
and Baron and Ferejohn [3, pp. 1189–1190]) to be highly susceptible to the multiplicity
problem.2 We shall, however, employ one structural assumption that is clearly restrictive:
The negotiation must have a finite horizon so that backward induction can be used to
organize the deletion of dominated strategies.
Our main result (Theorem 3.16) gives sufficient conditions for dominance solvability
of the bargaining game in question and, when these hold, identifies the implied outcome
of the interaction. No claim is made that the conditions are weak or likely to be satisfied
in most situations of interest.3 Indeed, it will be easy to exhibit economically-relevant
settings in which they fail. Our objectives, therefore, are modest ones: to show that the
bargaining situations in a circumscribed but not negligible class are dominance solvable,
and to use our somewhat nonstandard model to gain a new perspective on the monopoly
and multiplicity problems mentioned above.
1.2 An illustrative example
A trade liberalization conference has been called for a regional organization consisting of
the nations A, B, C, D, and E.4 Representatives of these countries will debate which of two
draft treaties, a or b, should be sent to their respective legislatures for ratification. The
negotiations will begin at nine o’clock on Monday morning and will end either when an
agreement is reached or (in the absence of an earlier agreement) at five o’clock on Friday
afternoon. There will be eight hours of discussions per day, and hence (up to) forty hours
2This being said, other escape routes from the multiplicity problem have been found in the multilateral
case. For example, Banks and Duggan [2] and Cho and Duggan [7] obtain core equivalence results in the
context of the Baron-Ferejohn model by endowing the alternative set with a one-dimensional structure.
3We shall therefore distinguish these “conditions” from our less objectionable “assumptions” regarding
various regularity or technical (e.g., genericity) properties of the model. Note that any assumption is a
tacit hypothesis of each result that follows it in the text, whereas conditions are appealed to explicitly.
4For later reference, note that this illustration is formalized in Example 4.2 below.
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A B C D E
draft a 64 48 32 16 −16
draft b −8 8 48 56 64
no agreement 40 40 40 40 40
Table 1: Preferences in the trade liberalization problem. Displayed are the payoffs (before
bargaining costs) to the five agents from the two draft treaties and from disagreement.
in total over the course of the week. According to the bylaws of the organization, each
country’s opinion is to be given equal weight and a supermajority of four votes is needed
to reach an agreement.
The payoffs to the five agents from the three possible substantive outcomes are shown
in Table 1. For example, agent C will receive 32 if a is agreed, 48 if b is agreed, and 40
if there is no agreement. In addition, each agent will lose one unit of payoff per hour of
negotiations, reflecting the opportunity cost of being in the conference center rather than
on the nearby beach. Note that — crucially — the default (“no agreement”) outcome is
not available to the bargainers until the end of the day on Friday, as agreeing to disagree
and heading to the beach before the end of the conference would be viewed as a dereliction
of duty by their superiors. And note also that the net payoff to each agent in the event
of default is 40− 40 = 0, a convenient normalization.
How should we expect this scenario to play out? Observe first of all that there are
two countries (A and B) that prefer draft a to draft b and three (C, D, and E) with the
opposite preference. Thus, in view of the need for four votes, the problem is a nontrivial
one. Can we conclude then that no agreement will be reached, or does one or the other
faction possess sufficient bargaining power to implement its preferred alternative?
Since the negotiations have a finite horizon, game theory offers the tool of backward
induction: The agents’ behavior in earlier contingencies will depend on what they expect
to happen in later ones, so we should think first about the end of the week and proceed
backwards.
1. At any time after thirty-two cumulative hours of meetings (i.e., any time on Friday),
we can be certain that no agreement will be reached. After this point each agent’s
payoff from his dispreferred alternative will be less than the disagreement payoff,
and thus no agent will be tempted to switch sides in order to gain release from the
conference room.
2. Between sixteen and thirty-two hours, agents A, B, D, and E will remain unwilling
to switch sides. Agent C, however, will be tempted to switch since alternative b is
clearly unattainable and a is preferable to default (which by Step 1 is the foreseeable
consequence of a failure to agree by the end of thirty-two hours). But since A, B,
and C together lack the power to force a, we should again expect disagreement.
3. Just before the end of sixteen hours, agents A, B, and E will continue to hold firm
while D will join C in being willing to defect. And since A, B, C, and D together
make up the requisite supermajority, we should expect agreement on alternative a
late Tuesday afternoon.
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4. Marginally earlier on Tuesday, the “continuation outcome” that can be anticipated
absent an immediate agreement is (by Step 3) that a will be agreed upon a moment
later. Agreement on a earlier rather than later is better for everyone, and there is
no prospect of choosing b once it is understood by A and B that a can be obtained
after a short delay. Thus a will be agreed upon at the earlier moment and hence
— applying the same logic inductively — at all moments before the end of sixteen
hours. In particular, we should expect a to be agreed upon immediately.
Observe that this analysis of the trade liberalization problem hinges upon a critical
moment (namely, the end of the sixteenth hour of negotiations) after which disagreement
is certain and just before which it is possible to assemble a coalition (consisting of A, B, C,
and D) whose members collectively have the power to implement one of the alternatives
(namely, a) and individually have an incentive to do so rather than waiting for the
default outcome. To identify these features of the problem, we can define the value of an
alternative to an agent as the latest time at which he prefers it to eventual default (e.g.,
C values a at thirty-two hours). The strength of a given coalition is then the smallest of
its members’ valuations, and the coalition that is strongest in this sense “wins” by having
its associated alternative selected immediately.
Of course, not all bargaining problems will yield so easily to this method. For example,
if each entry in the first two rows of Table 1 were to exceed 40 — making disagreement the
worst possible outcome for all agents — then coalitions in support of both a and b could
be assembled as late as the deadline and so no strongest coalition would exist. Excluding
such cases will be the role of the first condition used in our main result. And the second
will require that the alternative whose support is strongest be in the core of the relevant
coalitional game, so that any attempt to preempt its selection can be blocked.
It is instructive to note that throughout the above discussion we have had no need to
specify the fine details of the bargaining procedure followed by the trade representatives.
As already stated, our model will use a simultaneous voting protocol and our concern will
be with dominance solvability. But these choices are driven mainly by expediency: This
combination of elements happens to succeed in capturing the informal logic we have used
to predict the outcome of the trade scenario. In this respect our theory has the flavor
of an incentive compatibility analysis, and does not stand or fall on the “realism” of the
extensive form employed.5
We proceed now by outlining our general bargaining model in Section 2, establishing
the dominance solvability result in Section 3, considering two specialized environments
(namely, binary choice and bilateral surplus division) in Section 4, and concluding with
retrospective discussion of the theory in Section 5.
5Other models that are in some sense “procedure free” include those studied by Perry and Reny [19],
Sakovics [21], Abreu and Gul [1], and Smith and Stacchetti [23].
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2 Model
2.1 Extensive form
A group I of agents is jointly in charge of selecting exactly one alternative from a menu A.
(Assume that I and A are both finite sets containing at least two elements.) The interval
available for negotiation begins at date 0 and ends at a deadline normalized to date 1. If
no alternative is selected at or before this date, then a situation of default arises indicated
by the letter ω (where ω /∈ A). The full set of possible outcomes can then be defined as
X := A× [0, 1] ∪ {〈ω, 1〉}, with each combining a substantive result and a time value.
The agents are assumed to have preferences over the outcomes representable by utility
functions 〈ui〉i∈I with the following regularity properties.
Assumption 2.1. [A] For each i ∈ I, a, b ∈ A, and t ∈ [0, 1], we have ui(a, t) > ui(b, t)
if and only if ui(a, 0) > ui(b, 0). [B] For each i ∈ I and a ∈ A, the function ui(a, ·) on
[0, 1] is strictly decreasing and continuous. [C] For each i ∈ I we have ui(ω, 1) = 0.
Hence attitudes towards the alternatives are stable (A), time is valuable and the costs
associated with delay accrue in small increments (B), and default utilities are normalized
to zero (C). Moreover, it follows that each mapping ui(a, ·) of [0, 1] onto [ui(a, 1), ui(a, 0)]
has a strictly decreasing inverse ui(a, ·)
−1.
Although the bargainers could in principle reach an agreement at any instant t ∈ [0, 1],
we shall restrict this possibility to a finite sequence 〈k∆〉k∈K , where K := {0, 1, . . . , n},
of n+1 evenly-spaced decision points. (Thus ∆ := 1/n.) By increasing the discretization
parameter n ≥ 1, we can then approximate the underlying continuous time variable to
any desired degree of precision.
Bargaining will take the form of repeated, simultaneous voting by the agents at the
decision points. Each may vote for just one alternative at a time, and has also an option
to abstain (or vote for “continuation”) indicated by the letter β. We write V := A∪ {β}
for the action set and assume that at each decision point the actions taken at earlier
decision points are observed by all agents.
The conclusion of an agreement is governed by an exogenous decision rule ρ : ×i∈IV →
V . Writing v for the vector of votes by the agents at (some history at) decision point k∆,
the rule ρ determines what happens after these votes are cast: Specifically, if ρ(v) ∈ A
then this alternative is agreed upon immediately and the game ends; if ρ(v) = β and
k < n then voting commences again at decision point [k+1]∆; and if ρ(v) = β and k = n
then the default outcome is realized. We impose two natural restrictions on the decision
rule.
Assumption 2.2. [A] For each i ∈ I, a ∈ A, v ∈ ×i∈IV , and vi ∈ V , if ρ(v) = a and
vi 6= a then ρ(vi, v−i) = a. [B] For each a ∈ A we have ρ(aI) = a.
6
Hence whether or not a particular alternative is implemented depends only on the agents
voting for it (A, with vi 6= a), agreement is monotonic in the set of such agents (A, with
6Notation: Given J ⊂ I, we write zJ = 〈z〉i∈J and z−J = 〈z〉i∈I\J .
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Figure 1: Part of an extensive form representation of our repeated, simultaneous voting
game for the case of two agents (1 and 2), two alternatives (a and b), two decision points
(0 and 1), and the unanimity decision rule. The abstention option is indicated by β and
the default outcome by 〈ω, 1〉. Note that outcomes (rather than the associated payoffs)
are attached to the terminal histories and that at six non-terminal histories the tree has
been truncated due to a shortage of space.
vi = a), and unanimous consent is sufficient to select any available option (B).
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For the case of I = {1, 2}, A = {a, b}, n = 1, and the unanimity rule, a portion of a
game tree representing the procedure outlined above is illustrated in Figure 1.
For each k ∈ K \ {0}, let us write θk for the set of non-terminal histories at decision
point k∆. Denoting by h0 the null history and writing θ0 := {h
0}, we can proceed to
define the full set Θ :=
⋃
k∈K θk of non-terminal histories.
8 The subgame proceeding from
an arbitrary h ∈ Θ will be indicated by Γh.
A strategy for player i is a function si : Θ → V , while a strategy profile is a vector
s = 〈si〉i∈I . Explicit construction of the mapping s 7→ φ(s) ∈ X from strategy profiles to
the resulting outcomes is routine but tedious, and is omitted here.
2.2 Solution concept
The idea that a weakly dominated strategy can be disregarded and effectively eliminated
from a game has its roots in the normative analysis of statistical decision problems (see,
7Note that in addition to anonymous requirements for agreement ranging from a simple majority to
unanimity, the decision rule can incorporate weighted or multiple majority requirements such as those
used by the EU, as well as individual or joint vetoes such as those available in the UN Security Council.
8For example, in the case depicted in Figure 1 we have Θ = {h0, aβ, ab, βa, ββ, βb, ba, bβ}.
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e.g., Blackwell and Girshick [4]).9 Repeated application of this idea has been described
by Brandenburger and Keisler [5] as a “powerful” yet “conceptually puzzling” procedure,
and as a result has generated both “widespread and fruitful applications” (Ewerhart [9])
and penetrating theoretical investigations of its epistemic basis.
Whatever its merits, iterative weak dominance does suffer from the practical drawback
that the output of the procedure can depend upon the order in which strategies are
deleted. Fortunately, a result due to Gretlein [12, p. 113] (see also Marx and Swinkels [15])
serves to mitigate this problem.
[A]s long as players have strict preferences over the [outcomes] (of which there are a
finite number), if they successively eliminate some subset of dominated strategies,
. . . then the set of outcomes not eliminated will be the same no matter . . . which
dominated strategies [are] eliminated at each stage.
Thus we can guarantee order-independence by prohibiting indifference on the part of the
bargainers.
Assumption 2.3. For each i ∈ I, the restriction of ui to [A× {k∆}k∈K ] ∪ {〈ω, 1〉} (the
finite domain of realizable outcomes) is one-to-one.10
Given h ∈ Θ, let us write Ψh for the set of outcomes resulting from strategy profiles
that survive iterative weak dominance in the subgame Γh proceeding from history h. For
k ∈ K we may also define Ψ(k) := ∪h∈θkΨh, the outcomes that survive iterative weak
dominance in at least one of the subgames beginning at decision point k∆. And the overall
game will then be dominance solvable whenever ∃ψ0 ∈ X such that Ψ(0) = Ψh0 = {ψ0}.
In view of Assumption 2.3 and Gretlein’s theorem above, we can demonstrate that our
game is dominance solvable by exhibiting any particular strategy elimination procedure
that leaves a set of profiles all leading to the same outcome. The procedure that we shall
employ can be understood intuitively as one of backward induction allowing for multiple
rounds of deletion at each decision point. Starting from the final point, namely n∆ = 1,
we shall show first that (under specified conditions) ∃ψn ∈ X such that Ψ(n) = {ψn}.
We can then use ψn as the “continuation outcome” for each subgame proceeding from a
history in θn−1, and can go on to show that (under the relevant conditions) ∃ψn−1 ∈ X
such that Ψ(n − 1) = {ψn−1}. This backward induction procedure will eventually bring
us to the desired conclusion that ∃ψ0 ∈ X such that Ψ(0) = {ψ0}, and we will then have
shown that our game is dominance solvable with “solution” outcome ψ0.
11
9A strategy si weakly dominates another strategy sˆi for agent i if for each profile s−i of strategies for
I\{i}we have ui(φ(si, s−i)) ≥ ui(φ(sˆi, s−i)) and for some such s−i we have ui(φ(si, s−i)) > ui(φ(sˆi, s−i)).
10Observe that this rules out both “genuine” indifference (of the form ui(a, 0) = ui(b, 0) for a 6= b)
and “coincidental” indifference (of either the form ui(a, k∆) = 0 or the form ui(a, k∆) = ui(b,m∆) for
a 6= b and k < m). While the second prohibition is not a major restriction in view of our discretization
of time, the first has significant economic content.
11Our use of the term “backward induction” here and throughout the paper is meant to be suggestive
rather than literal: Since our game has simultaneous moves and hence imperfect information, ordinary
backward induction is not well-defined. Note also that our procedure for eliminating strategies resembles
the application of iterated conditional dominance (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole [10, pp. 128–129]),
the main difference being that we inspect for conditional weak dominance at each iteration and rely on
Gretlein’s theorem for order-independence of the resulting outcome set.
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In accordance with our interpretation of ψk+1 as the continuation outcome for the
subgames proceeding from histories in θk, let us write Ψ(n + 1) = {ψn+1} := {〈ω, 1〉} to
reflect that the last decision point is the deadline for agreement.
The notion of dominance solvability outlined above resembles that used by Moulin [16]
in his well-known analysis of voting games. (See also Gretlein [11].) As defined the two
concepts are distinct: While Moulin asks only that the strategies remaining for each player
after iterative deletion be equivalent, we make the stronger demand that the remaining
strategy profiles all lead to the same outcome. In the presence of Assumption 2.3, however,
these requirements coincide and our game will (under specified conditions) be “d-solvable”
[16, p. 1339].
3 Analysis
3.1 Backward induction lemma
In this section we define a notion of collective acceptability of an alternative at a decision
point with respect to a continuation outcome, and then use this definition to state and
prove the backward induction lemma upon which our analysis is based.
The following will be the relevant notion of acceptability.
Definition 3.1. Given k ∈ K and x ∈ X, an alternative a is said to be viable at k∆ with
respect to x if ∃J ⊂ I such that ρ(aJ , β−J) = a and ∀i ∈ J we have ui(a, k∆) ≥ ui(x).
In other words, an alternative is viable at a decision point with respect to an outcome —
to be thought of as the consequences of continuation — if the members of some coalition
with the ability to implement this alternative would be willing to do so were they each
to conclude that no other agreement could at present be reached. Note that it is possible
for zero, one, or more than one alternative to have this property at the same time and
with respect to the same outcome.
When we put the above definition to use at a given decision point k∆, the role of the
continuation outcome will be filled by the (common) iterative dominance solution ψk+1
of the subgames proceeding from histories in θk+1. To apply the concept of viability in
this fashion we shall of course first have to confirm that such a solution exists; i.e., that
∃ψk+1 ∈ X such that Ψ(k + 1) = {ψk+1}. But since our method will be one of backward
induction, this will already have been shown by the time we come to consider decision
point k∆.
Our lemma states that if Ψ(k+1) contains a single outcome, then Ψ(k) also contains
a single outcome provided that no more than one alternative is viable at k∆ with respect
to ψk+1. If no alternative is viable then iterative weak dominance selects the continuation
outcome, whereas if exactly one alternative is viable then this alternative is agreed upon
at once.
Lemma 3.2. Given k ∈ K, suppose that ∃ψk+1 ∈ X such that Ψ(k+1) = {ψk+1}. [A] If
no alternative is viable at k∆ with respect to ψk+1, then Ψ(k) = Ψ(k + 1) = {ψk+1}.
[B] If a◦ ∈ A is uniquely viable at k∆ with respect to ψk+1, then Ψ(k) = {〈a
◦, k∆〉}.
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Proof. Given i ∈ I, a ∈ A, h ∈ θk, and a profile s−i of strategies for I \ {i}, call player i
“pivotal” for a at h against s−i whenever both ρ(a, s−i(h)) = a and ρ(β, s−i(h)) 6= a, in
which case Assumption 2.2A implies that ρ(β, s−i(h)) = β.
Given i ∈ I, a ∈ A, and h ∈ θk, consider any strategy si for i satisfying si(h) = a.
Define a new strategy sˆi by sˆi(h) = β and sˆi(h
′) = si(h
′) for each h′ ∈ Θ\{h}. Restricting
these two strategies to the subgame Γh, we find that they yield the same outcome ∀s−i
against which i is not pivotal for a at h. Moreover, ∀s−i against which i is pivotal, si
yields 〈a, k∆〉 while sˆi yields ψk+1 once all strategies that are iteratively dominated in
proper subgames of Γh have been deleted. And it follows that si is iteratively dominated
in Γh whenever ui(ψk+1) > ui(a, k∆).
[A] Suppose that a given a ∈ A is not viable at k∆ with respect to ψk+1, and consider
any J ⊂ I such that ρ(aJ , β−J) = a. Then ∃i ∈ J such that ui(ψk+1) > ui(a, k∆), and
so ∀h ∈ θk the restriction to Γh of any strategy si for i satisfying si(h) = a is iteratively
dominated. But this implies that 〈a, k∆〉 cannot survive iterative dominance in Γh, and
therefore if no alternative is viable at k∆ with respect to ψk+1 we have that Ψh = {ψk+1}.
Finally, since h ∈ θk is arbitrary, we can conclude that Ψ(k) = {ψk+1} as desired.
[B] Since a◦ is uniquely viable at k∆ with respect to ψk+1, no b ∈ A\{a
◦} can be viable
and so ∀h ∈ θk the corresponding outcomes 〈b, k∆〉 cannot survive iterative dominance
in Γh.
Given i ∈ I, vi ∈ V \ {a
◦}, and h ∈ θk, consider any strategy si for i with si(h) = vi.
Define a new strategy sˆi by sˆi(h) = a
◦ and sˆi(h
′) = si(h
′) for each h′ ∈ Θ\{h}. Restricting
these two strategies to the subgame Γh, we find that (after the outcomes 〈b, k∆〉 for b 6= a
◦
have been ruled out) they yield the same result ∀s−i against which i is not pivotal for a
◦
at h. Moreover, ∀s−i against which i is pivotal, si yields ψk+1 while sˆi yields 〈a
◦, k∆〉 once
all strategies that are iteratively dominated in proper subgames of Γh have been deleted.
And it follows that si is iteratively dominated in Γh whenever ui(a
◦, k∆) > ui(ψk+1).
Since a◦ is viable at k∆ with respect to ψk+1, ∃J ⊂ I such that ρ(a
◦
J , β−J) = a
◦
and ∀i ∈ J we have ui(a
◦, k∆) ≥ ui(ψk+1). For each such i it follows that ui(a
◦, k∆) >
ui(ψk+1) by Assumption 2.3. From this we can conclude that ∀h ∈ θk the restriction to Γh
of any strategy si for i ∈ J satisfying si(h) 6= a
◦ is iteratively dominated, leaving for such
i only strategies that specify a◦ at h. Regardless of the profile s−J of strategies for I \ J ,
we have that ρ(a◦J , s−J(h)) = a
◦ by Assumption 2.2A, and therefore Ψh = {〈a
◦, k∆〉}.
Finally, since h ∈ θk is arbitrary, we can conclude that Ψ(k) = {〈a
◦, k∆〉} as desired.
3.2 The consensus point
We now turn our attention to a concept at the heart of the present theory: that of the
“consensus point” associated with the bargaining problem under consideration. What we
aim to show is that this point is the de facto deadline for an agreement, even though it
may precede the official deadline (which we have normalized to date 1).
Our definition of the consensus point is by way of two useful prior concepts.
Definition 3.3. [A] The latest acceptance point of agent i for alternative a is defined
by ξi(a) := sup{t ∈ [0, 1] : ui(a, t) ≥ 0}. [B] The latest feasible point of alternative a
9
0 ξi(a) 1
s0
ui(a, 0)
ui(a, 1)
Figure 2: The “latest acceptance point” ξi(a). When ui(a, 0) ≥ 0, this is the last moment
at which agent i weakly prefers agreement on alternative a to eventual default. When
ui(a, 0) < 0 (in which case no such last moment exists), we have ξi(a) = −∞.
is defined by Ξ(a) := max {mini∈J ξi(a) : J ⊂ I and ρ(aJ , β−J) = a}. [C] The consensus
point is defined by Ξ∗ := maxa∈A Ξ(a).
The latest acceptance point ξi(a) measures the appeal of alternative a to agent i on
the time dimension of the negotiation. When ui(a, 1) ≥ 0 this point takes on the value 1;
when ui(a, 0) ≥ 0 > ui(a, 1) it takes on the value ui(a, ·)
−1(0); and when ui(a, 0) < 0 it
takes on the value −∞. (See Figure 2.) Thus the agent can do no more to demonstrate
his delight at the prospect of alternative a than to exhibit ξi(a) = 1, and no more to
demonstrate his displeasure than to exhibit ξi(a) = −∞.
Similarly, the latest feasible point Ξ(a) measures the appeal of alternative a to the
collective, equalling the acceptance point of the most skeptical member of that coalition
with the ability to implement a that is easiest to assemble. The consensus point is then
simply the last of the alternatives’ latest feasible points, with Ξ∗ = −∞ indicating that
∀a ∈ A we have Ξ(a) = −∞ and Ξ∗ = 1 indicating that ∃a ∈ A such that Ξ(a) = 1.
Example 3.4. Let I = {1, 2, 3}, A = {a1, a2, a3}, and


u1(a1, t) u1(a2, t) u1(a3, t)
u2(a1, t) u2(a2, t) u2(a3, t)
u3(a1, t) u3(a2, t) u3(a3, t)

 =


6/5− t −1/5− t −2/5− t
3/5− t 4/5− t −3/5− t
1/5− t 2/5− t 7/5− t

 .
For each a ∈ A and v ∈ ×i∈IV , let ρ(v) = a if and only if |{i ∈ I : vi = a}| ≥ 2. We then
have the latest acceptance points


ξ1(a1) ξ1(a2) ξ1(a3)
ξ2(a1) ξ2(a2) ξ2(a3)
ξ3(a1) ξ3(a2) ξ3(a3)

 =


1 −∞ −∞
3/5 4/5 −∞
1/5 2/5 1

 ,
the latest feasible points 〈Ξ(a1),Ξ(a2),Ξ(a3)〉 = 〈3/5, 2/5,−∞〉, and the consensus point
Ξ∗ = 3/5.
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Example 3.5. Let the agents, alternatives, and preferences be as in Example 3.4. For
each a ∈ A and v ∈ ×i∈IV , let ρ(v) = a if and only if both |{i ∈ I : vi = a}| ≥ 2 and
v3 = a. We then have the latest feasible points 〈Ξ(a1),Ξ(a2),Ξ(a3)〉 = 〈1/5, 2/5,−∞〉
and the consensus point Ξ∗ = 2/5.
Our interest in the consensus point is due to its status as the earliest date after which
we can guarantee that there will be no agreement. When Ξ∗ < 0 (i.e., when Ξ∗ = −∞)
this implies that there can never be agreement at any decision point; when Ξ∗ = 1 the
conclusion is true but vacuous; and when 0 ≤ Ξ∗ < 1 it tells us that while agreement may
be possible at the outset, any such possibility will vanish if the game lasts long enough.
The necessity of disagreement after the consensus point can be shown inductively. By
construction, no alternative can be viable with respect to the default outcome 〈ω, 1〉 at
any decision point k∆ ∈ (Ξ∗, 1]. But the default outcome is precisely what will occur
if the deadline is reached without an agreement, and the result then follows easily from
Lemma 3.2A.
Proposition 3.6. For each k ∈ K, if k∆ > Ξ∗ then Ψ(k) = {〈ω, 1〉}.
Proof. The proof is by induction. Firstly, recall that Ψ(n + 1) = {〈ω, 1〉}. Now, given
k ∈ K such that k∆ > Ξ∗, suppose that Ψ(k + 1) = {〈ω, 1〉}. If some a ∈ A were viable
at k∆ with respect to 〈ω, 1〉, then by definition there would exist a J ⊂ I such that
ρ(aJ , β−J) = a and ∀i ∈ J we have ui(a, k∆) ≥ 0. For each such i we would then have
ξi(a) ≥ k∆, which would imply that Ξ
∗ ≥ Ξ(a) ≥ mini∈J ξi(a) ≥ k∆, a contradiction.
Thus no alternative is viable at k∆ with respect to 〈ω, 1〉, so by Lemma 3.2A we have
that Ψ(k) = Ψ(k + 1) = {〈ω, 1〉} as desired.
3.3 Agreement at the consensus point
Having shown (in Proposition 3.6) that no agreement will be reached after the consensus
point, we now give a condition under which an agreement will be reached at (or rather,
because of our discretization of time, near) this date.
The condition to be used requires simply that no more than one alternative be viable
at the deadline with respect to the default outcome.
Condition 3.7 (Terminal Solvability). At most one alternative is viable at n∆ = 1 with
respect to ψn+1 = 〈ω, 1〉.
This requirement is severe: Many situations of interest (e.g., the classic surplus-division
problem with zero payoff from disagreement) will admit coalitions that could form in
support of two or more distinct alternatives at the deadline, thus violating the condition.
But the failure of our theory to make predictions about such situations has nothing to
do with their dynamic structure, since at the deadline any bargaining problem is by
definition “static” — having no remaining intertemporal aspect. We deliberately refrain
here from taking a position as to the resolution of problems of this sort, and so it is only
right that situations which call for a theory of static bargaining should remain beyond
the scope of the present analysis. (See Section 5.2 for further discussion of this point.)
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Figure 3: Assumptions 3.8 and 3.10. Any two distinct latest acceptance points ξi(a) and
ξj(b) that fall in the interval [0, 1) must take on different values (a genericity requirement)
and must be separated by a decision point (a “fineness” requirement).
When Terminal Solvability holds, dominance solvability of the subgames proceeding
from histories in θn is guaranteed by Lemma 3.2. If an alternative is viable at n∆ with
respect to ψn+1, then the consensus point is the deadline and we have that the alternative
in question will be agreed upon at this date. If, on the other hand, no alternative is viable,
then what we must show is that (when Ξ∗ ≥ 0) an agreement will be reached at the latest
decision point k∗∆ := [sup{k ∈ K : k∆ ≤ Ξ∗}]∆ no later than the consensus point. To
establish this we will need a genericity assumption ensuring that as we proceed backwards
along the interval [0, 1), two alternatives do not become viable with respect to the default
outcome at precisely the same instant. (See Figure 3.)
Assumption 3.8. For each i, j ∈ I and a, b ∈ A such that both ui(a, 0) ≥ 0 > ui(a, 1)
and uj(b, 0) ≥ 0 > uj(b, 1), we have ui(a, ·)
−1(0) = uj(b, ·)
−1(0) only if both i = j and
a = b.12
Together with the above condition, this assumption allows us (when Ξ∗ ≥ 0) to identify
a unique alternative whose latest feasible point is the consensus point.
Lemma 3.9. Let Terminal Solvability hold. If Ξ∗ ≥ 0 then there exists a unique a∗ ∈ A
such that Ξ(a∗) = Ξ∗.
Proof. Suppose that there exist distinct a, b ∈ A such that Ξ(a) = Ξ(b) = Ξ∗. In the
event that Ξ∗ = 1 both a and b would be viable at n∆ = 1 with respect to ψn+1 = 〈ω, 1〉,
which is ruled out by Terminal Solvability. In the event that 0 ≤ Ξ∗ < 1 there would exist
i, j ∈ I such that ui(a, ·)
−1(0) = ξi(a) = Ξ(a) = Ξ(b) = ξj(b) = uj(b, ·)
−1(0), which is
forbidden by Assumption 3.8. Hence Ξ∗ < 0, and the result follows by contraposition.
When applicable, this result will serve as the definition of a∗, the first alternative to
become viable with respect to the default outcome as we proceed backwards from the
deadline towards the beginning of the negotiation.
One further technical assumption is needed to show that a∗ will be agreed upon at
k∗∆ whenever Ξ∗ ≥ 0. Not only must there be a unique alternative whose latest feasible
point is the consensus point; the discretization of time must be fine enough to separate
this point from the latest feasible points of the other alternatives. (Again see Figure 3.)
12This assumption is somewhat stronger than necessary: What is actually required is that among the
alternatives with latest feasible points in [0, 1), that with the last such point is unique. Note also that
we permit the latest acceptance points of the agents for the alternatives to coincide at −∞ and 1, since
these are the extrema of the set of values that any particular ξi(a) can take on.
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Assumption 3.10. For each i, j ∈ I and a, b ∈ A such that both ui(a, 0) ≥ 0 > ui(a, 1)
and uj(b, 0) ≥ 0 > uj(b, 1), if either i 6= j or a 6= b then we have that ∆ < |ui(a, ·)
−1(0)−
uj(b, ·)
−1(0)|.13
And with this assumption in place, we obtain the desired result.
Proposition 3.11. Let Terminal Solvability hold. If Ξ∗ ≥ 0 then Ψ(k∗) = {〈a∗, k∗∆〉}.
Proof. If Ξ∗ ≥ 0 then {k ∈ K : k∆ ≤ Ξ∗} 6= ∅ and so k∗ ∈ K. By the definition of k∗ we
then have [k∗+1]∆ > Ξ∗, so Ψ(k∗+1) = {〈ω, 1〉} by Proposition 3.6. Since Ξ(a∗) = Ξ∗ ≥
k∗∆, alternative a∗ is viable at k∗∆ with respect to 〈ω, 1〉. Moreover, if some a 6= a∗ were
also viable then by Lemma 3.9 we would have k∗∆ ≤ Ξ(a) < Ξ(a∗) = Ξ∗ < [k∗ + 1]∆,
contradicting Assumption 3.10. Hence a∗ is uniquely viable at k∗∆ with respect to 〈ω, 1〉,
and by Lemma 3.2B it follows that Ψ(k∗) = {〈a∗, k∗∆〉} as desired.
3.4 Agreement at the outset
In this section we conclude the analysis of our bargaining game by providing a condition
under which any agreement will be immediate.
When Ξ∗ ≥ 0, Proposition 3.11 ensures that under Terminal Solvability alternative
a∗ (defined by Lemma 3.9) will be agreed upon at decision point k∗∆. If, in addition,
k∗ > 0, then since time is valuable we have that a∗ is viable at the previous decision
point [k∗ − 1]∆ with respect to the continuation outcome ψk∗ = 〈a
∗, k∗∆〉. If no other
alternative were viable, Lemma 3.2B would secure agreement at the earlier point and
hence, by induction, at the outset. This can be achieved by requiring two things: Firstly,
we ask that a∗ be in the core of the coalitional game associated with the bargaining
problem under consideration.
Condition 3.12 (Core Membership). If Ξ∗ ≥ 0 then for each a ∈ A such that Ξ(a) = Ξ∗
and each b ∈ A \ {a} and J ⊂ I such that ρ(bJ , β−J) = b, there exists an i ∈ J such that
ui(a, 0) > ui(b, 0).
Example 3.13. In Example 3.4 we have a∗ = a1; ρ(β, a2, a2) = a2; u2(a1, 0) < u2(a2, 0);
and u3(a1, 0) < u3(a2, 0); and hence Core Membership fails.
Example 3.14. In Example 3.5 we have a∗ = a2; ρ(v) = a1 only if v3 = a1 and, moreover,
u3(a2, 0) > u3(a1, 0); and ρ(v) = a3 only if |{i ∈ I : vi = a3}| ≥ 2, u1(a2, 0) > u1(a3, 0),
and u2(a2, 0) > u2(a3, 0); and hence Core Membership holds.
And secondly, we ask that the time interval be sufficiently small relative to the variability
of the agents’ utility functions, which is to say that n is sufficiently large. (See Figure 4.)
Assumption 3.15. For each i ∈ I, each a, b ∈ A such that ui(a, 0) > ui(b, 0), and each
t ∈ [0, 1−∆], we have ui(a, t+∆) > ui(b, t).
13It is important to realize that both Assumption 3.10 and Assumption 3.15 below require only that
the parameter n be larger than some given finite value. These assumptions do not relate to any sort of
limit game in which the discretization of time is somehow infinitely fine. Indeed, nowhere in this paper
are there limiting arguments or results of any kind.
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Figure 4: Assumption 3.15. The discretization parameter n must be large enough that
any agent i’s loss (L) from replacing a more attractive alternative a with a less attractive
alternative b is never outweighed by his gain (G) from concluding an agreement ∆ = 1/n
units of time earlier.
We are now in a position to state and prove our main result.
Theorem 3.16. Let both Terminal Solvability and Core Membership hold. Then Ξ∗ ≥ 0
only if Ψ(0) = {〈a∗, 0〉}, whereas Ξ∗ < 0 only if Ψ(0) = {〈ω, 1〉}.
Proof. For the case of Ξ∗ ≥ 0, the proof is by induction. Firstly, by Proposition 3.11
we have that Ψ(k∗) = {〈a∗, k∗∆〉}. Now, given k ∈ K such that k < k∗, suppose that
Ψ(k + 1) = {〈a∗, [k + 1]∆〉}. Since ρ(a∗I) = a
∗ by Assumption 2.2B and ∀i ∈ I we have
ui(a
∗, k∆) > ui(a
∗, [k + 1]∆) by Assumption 2.1B, alternative a∗ is viable at k∆ with
respect to 〈a∗, [k + 1]∆〉. Given a ∈ A \ {a∗} and J ⊂ I such that ρ(aJ , β−J) = a, Core
Membership guarantees the existence of an i ∈ J such that ui(a
∗, 0) > ui(a, 0), and hence
ui(a
∗, [k+1]∆) > ui(a, k∆) by Assumption 3.15. It follows that a is not viable and hence
a∗ is uniquely viable at k∆ with respect to 〈a∗, [k + 1]∆〉, so that Ψ(k) = {〈a∗, k∆〉} by
Lemma 3.2B.
For the case of Ξ∗ < 0, the conclusion follows from Proposition 3.6.
In other words: Terminal Solvability and Core Membership together guarantee dominance
solvability. Nonnegativity of the consensus point is the criterion for agreement. When
agreement occurs it is immediate, and the alternative agreed upon is that whose latest
acceptance point equals the consensus point.14
14To emphasize what is no doubt obvious by this stage, neither Theorem 3.16 nor any other result in
the present paper has anything to say about the equilibrium outcomes of our bargaining game (at least
not directly). These will typically be very numerous: For example, if no agent can unilaterally either force
or prevent any alternative, then every feasible outcome will be supported by an equilibrium. Refinements
such as subgame and trembling-hand perfection generally do little to reduce this multiplicity. But our
theorem shows that in certain circumstances iterative weak dominance can make sharper predictions —
and of course does so without any need for an assumption of equilibrium behavior in the first place.
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4 Specialized environments
4.1 Binary choice
One class of bargaining environments to which Theorem 3.16 can be applied contains
binary (two-alternative) choice problems in which, at the deadline, each agent ranks
the default outcome strictly between the two available agreement outcomes. Here no
compromise is possible between the two options, and at date 1 each bargainer would
rather fail to reach an agreement than accept his disfavored alternative — though he
may accept it earlier in order to avoid delay.15
Proposition 4.1. Let A = {0, 1}. If for each i ∈ I we have either ui(0, 1) > 0 > ui(1, 1)
or ui(1, 1) > 0 > ui(0, 1), then both Terminal Solvability and Core Membership hold.
Proof. Given a ∈ A, let F (a) := {i ∈ I : ui(a, 0) > ui(1− a, 0)} and observe that then a
is viable at n∆ = 1 with respect to ψn+1 = 〈ω, 1〉 if and only if ρ(aF (a), βF (1−a)) = a. It
follows that a is viable only if ρ(aF (a), [1− a]F (1−a)) = a (using Assumption 2.2A), which
implies that ρ(βF (a), [1− a]F (1−a)) 6= 1− a and so 1− a is not viable. Therefore Terminal
Solvability holds.
If Core Membership fails, then ∃a ∈ A such that Ξ(a) = Ξ∗ ≥ Ξ(1− a) and a J ⊂ I
such that both ρ([1−a]J , β−J) = 1−a and ∀i ∈ J we have ui(a, 0) ≤ ui(1−a, 0). It follows
that J ⊂ F (1−a) and ρ([1−a]F (1−a), βF (a)) = 1−a by Assumptions 2.1A and 2.2A, and
hence 1 − a is viable at n∆ = 1 with respect to ψn+1 = 〈ω, 1〉. This, however, implies
that Ξ(a) ≥ Ξ(1− a) = 1 and so a is also viable, contradicting Terminal Solvability. By
contraposition, Core Membership must hold.
Example 4.2. Let I = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, A = {0, 1}, and


u1(0, t) u1(1, t)
u2(0, t) u2(1, t)
u3(0, t) u3(1, t)
u4(0, t) u4(1, t)
u5(0, t) u5(1, t)


=


8/5− t −1/5− t
6/5− t 1/5− t
4/5− t 6/5− t
2/5− t 7/5− t
−2/5− t 8/5− t


.
For each a ∈ A and v ∈ ×i∈IV , let ρ(v) = a if and only if |{i ∈ I : vi = a}| ≥ 4. We then
have the latest acceptance points


ξ1(0) ξ1(1)
ξ2(0) ξ2(1)
ξ3(0) ξ3(1)
ξ4(0) ξ4(1)
ξ5(0) ξ5(1)


=


1 −∞
1 1/5
4/5 1
2/5 1
−∞ 1


,
the latest feasible points 〈Ξ(0),Ξ(1)〉 = 〈2/5, 1/5〉, and the consensus point Ξ∗ = 2/5.
Note that here the chosen alternative a∗ = 0 is favored by a minority of the agents.
15One example of such a problem might be that faced by a jury charged with deciding whether to
acquit or convict, and given both rules for reaching a verdict (e.g., majority or unanimity) and an explicit
or implicit deadline at which point it will be declared to be deadlocked (the default outcome).
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Example 4.3. Let the agents, alternatives, and preferences be as in Example 4.2. For
each a ∈ A and v ∈ ×i∈IV , let ρ(v) = a if and only if |{i ∈ I : vi = a}| ≥ 3. We then
have the latest feasible points 〈Ξ(0),Ξ(1)〉 = 〈4/5, 1〉 and the consensus point Ξ∗ = 1.
Note that here the chosen alternative a∗ = 1 is the one favored by agent 3, who functions
as a sort of median voter.
4.2 Bilateral surplus division
As a second application, we now specialize our theory to the bilateral surplus division
problem studied by Rubinstein [20], among others. In this setting we have two agents,
a finite number of alternatives drawn from A◦ := {〈a1, a2〉 ∈ ℜ
2
+ : a1 + a2 = 1}, and the
unanimity rule.
Proposition 4.4. Let I = {1, 2} and A ⊂ A◦, and ∀a ∈ A and v ∈ ×i∈IV let ρ(v) = a if
and only if v = aI . Moreover, suppose that for each i ∈ I there exists a constant γi such
that ∀a ∈ A we have ui(a, 1) = ai− γi. If γ1 + γ2 ≥ 1, then both Terminal Solvability and
Core Membership hold.
Proof. If a given a ∈ A is viable at n∆ = 1 with respect to ψn+1 = 〈ω, 1〉 then both
γ1 ≤ a1 and γ2 ≤ a2 and hence γ1 + γ2 = 1 (since a ∈ A
◦), which can be true only if
γ1 = a1 and γ2 = a2. If some b ∈ A is also viable, then similarly γ1 = b1 and γ2 = b2, and
it follows that b = a. Therefore Terminal Solvability holds.
If Core Membership fails, then there exist distinct a, b ∈ A such that Ξ(a) = Ξ∗ ≥ 0
and (in view of the unanimity rule) ∀i ∈ I we have ui(a, 0) ≤ ui(b, 0). It follows that
∀i ∈ I we have ξi(b) ≥ ξi(a), that Ξ(b) = mini∈I ξi(b) ≥ mini∈I ξi(a) = Ξ(a) = Ξ
∗,
and hence that Ξ(b) = Ξ∗. But since Ξ∗ ≥ 0 and the alternatives a and b are distinct,
Lemma 3.9 implies that this contradicts Terminal Solvability. By contraposition, Core
Membership must hold.
Example 4.5. For each a ∈ A let u1(a, t) = a1− t/5−2/5 and u2(a, t) = a2−2t/5−1/5.
We then have
Ξ(a) = min{ξ1(a), ξ2(a)} =


ξ1(a) = −∞ if 0 ≤ a1 < 6/15,
ξ1(a) = 5a1 − 2 if 6/15 ≤ a1 ≤ 8/15,
ξ2(a) = 2− 5a1/2 if 8/15 < a1 ≤ 12/15,
ξ2(a) = −∞ if 12/15 < a1 ≤ 1,
(see Figure 5). And when ∀a◦ ∈ A◦ there exists a nearby a ∈ A, we have also Ξ∗ ≈ 2/3
and immediate agreement on a∗ ≈ 〈8/15, 7/15〉.
Example 4.6. For each a ∈ A let u1(a, t) = a1−t/6−1/2 and u2(a, t) = a2−t/6−19/30.
We then have Ξ(a) = min{ξ1(a), ξ2(a)} = −∞ everywhere and eventual disagreement.
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Figure 5: Example 4.5 — bilateral surplus division with constant delay costs. The
allocation a1 to agent 1 is measured on the horizontal axis and time on the vertical axis.
Plotted is the latest feasible point function Ξ(a) (over the domain A◦), which reaches its
maximum value of 2/3 at the allocation 〈a1, a2〉 = 〈8/15, 7/15〉.
5 Discussion
5.1 The horizon and the default outcome
Apart from the requirement (implicit in our solution concept) of complete information,
the most conspicuous structural assumption of our model is that the bargaining will end
at a fixed, known deadline. It would appear to be possible to relax this assumption and
allow the negotiations to continue indefinitely, as in the Rubinstein model and its many
variants. And in fact if we were to do so — replacing default with the outcome of endless
deliberations — then the machinery of our analysis would, mutatis mutandis, continue to
be perfectly well-defined. In particular, we could compute the consensus point Ξ∗ just as
before and could formulate appropriate versions of the conditions used in Theorem 3.16.
It is not true, however, that our results would continue to hold in this infinite-horizon
setting. While Lemma 3.2 would remain unaffected, there would be no opportunity for us
to apply the lemma in the absence of a last decision point. At an intuitive level it would
remain clear, for example, that no agreement can be expected after Ξ∗ (Proposition 3.6),
but without a deadline this conclusion would no longer follow from iterative dominance
— at least absent some further modification to our model not attempted here.
Another natural question is whether the consequences of default (indicated by ω)
cannot simply be subsumed into the set A. This would allow the bargainers to abandon
their attempts to reach an agreement at any point during the negotiation, and thus save
on waiting costs if disagreement is thought to be likely anyway (or even desirable).
One response to this question is that if we impose ω ∈ A, then it is far from clear
which coalitions should be given the right to force this alternative. If we wish to allow
the agents to “walk away from the negotiating table” unilaterally, then ∀i ∈ I we must
17
have ρ(ωi, β−i) = ω. But, in view of Assumption 2.2A, this will give each agent a veto
over every alternative; i.e., it is consistent only with the unanimity rule. The message
here is that our basic model is not rich enough to accommodate outside options, and that
these will need to be introduced explicitly by changing the extensive form.
A second response to the proposal to let ω ∈ A is that there are plenty of situations
in which bargainers will not be able to end their discussions prematurely. For example,
when negotiating authority is delegated and the delegates bear the costs of delay (as in
the trade liberalization scenario of Section 1.2), early termination of the attempt to find
an agreement will not typically be permitted. Similarly, a jury does not have the power
to declare itself to be deadlocked; this is a decision for the presiding judge, who may
well order a return to the jury room for further deliberations. And even when sovereign
entities are bargaining amongst themselves in the absence of any overarching authority
that can compel participation, they may not be able to irrevocably commit to abandoning
their negotiation before the opportunity for an agreement disappears.
5.2 Static and dynamic bargaining
When introducing Terminal Solvability in Section 3.3, we referred to a bargaining problem
as “static” if it has no significant intertemporal element — as opposed to “dynamic”
problems that do have such an element.16 And as already observed, our dynamic model
reduces to a static problem upon the arrival of the final decision point n∆ = 1. Taking
this point of view one step further, we can think of the overall model as consisting of n+1
static problems corresponding to the decision points and linked by the passage of time.
While the consequences of disagreement in the last of these problems are captured in the
exogenous default outcome 〈ω, 1〉, the continuation outcomes of the earlier n problems
will be endogenous.
The reinterpretation of dynamic bargaining as repeated static bargaining leads to a
new perspective on our theory. On this reading our backward induction lemma becomes
the statement that static bargaining problems in which no more than one alternative is
viable are dominance solvable. Consequently, a dynamic problem will be solvable if each
of its constituent static problems has this characteristic.17 And the conditions used in
Theorem 3.16 can then be seen to supply exactly what is needed to guarantee solvability
by means of the fact expressed in the lemma.18
This intuition for why our conditions are sufficient for dominance solvability also
16In this usage static does not imply instantaneous: If we lock two bargainers in a cell with a blank
contract and declare that we will return in one hour to collect it, the resulting problem will be a static
one since no benefit arises from agreeing earlier rather than later during the period of confinement.
17This intuition is reminiscent of Moulin’s [16, pp. 1342–1343] observation that a certain variety of
dynamic “voting scheme” will be dominance solvable whenever each of the static schemes it contains has
this property. The main difference here is that Moulin requires his static schemes to be solvable for any
preferences on the part of the voters (like perfect-information game forms), whereas we consider only the
particular preference profile induced by backward induction on the larger dynamic problem.
18Viz.: Terminal Solvability is needed to ensure that at most one alternative is viable in the final static
problem (since latest acceptance points can stack up at the deadline), while Core Membership is needed
to ensure that in static problems prior to decision point k∗∆ (see Section 3.3) no alternative is viable
other than the unique a∗ ∈ A for which Ξ(a∗) = Ξ∗.
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helps to clarify why they cannot be necessary. Lemma 3.2 says nothing about static
problems in which more than one alternative is viable, and in fact these may or may
not be solvable.19 By constructing a dynamic problem out of solvable static problems,
at least one of which is of this “multi-viable” type, we can therefore create a game that
violates either of our conditions but nevertheless exhibits solvability.
In general, of course, multi-viable static problems will not be dominance solvable and
so (when our conditions fail) some further assumption regarding the resolution of these
problems will be required if we are to make definite predictions.20 An example of such an
assumption is temporal monopoly, which in this context would state that at each decision
point some agent is given the right to make a “take it or leave it” proposal. To dispense
bargaining power by fiat in this fashion may seem arbitrary and undesirable. But no
alternative assumption springs to mind as an obvious improvement, and thus it appears
that we may have to either lower our ambitions for bargaining theory or live with the
“monopoly problem” (see Section 1.1).21
Similarly, and in conclusion, we can use our new perspective to better understand
the “multiplicity problem” afflicting many bargaining models. While not the only factor
relevant here, the presence of multi-viable static bargaining problems within a dynamic
model can contribute to the proliferation of equilibria. Multiple viable alternatives set up
a coordination game among the agents, so unless the extensive form employed imposes a
theory of static bargaining comparable to temporal monopoly, multiple equilibria robust
to refinements (a feature of coordination games generally) will be unavoidable. And since
dynamic considerations such as delay costs can have no bearing on static problems, the
idea that relative patience confers bargaining power — an insight central to the modern
literature on negotiations — cannot help us here.
19For an example of the solvable case, let I = {1, 2, 3} and A = {a, b}; endow the agents with the
preferences a ≻1 b ≻1 ω, a ≻2 b ≻2 ω, and b ≻3 ω ≻3 a (where ω represents the continuation outcome);
and suppose that the support of at least two agents is required to force either alternative. Here both a
and b are viable with respect to ω, but the simultaneous voting game is dominance solvable: Neither 1
nor 2 will vote for β (i.e., continuation), hence 3 will vote for b, hence 1 and 2 will vote for a, and hence
a will be selected.
20Analogously, in the context of incomplete information, Kennan and Wilson [13, pp. 50–55] stress the
indeterminacy of incentive compatibility analysis (e.g., Myerson [17]) as compared to the “fairly specific
predictions” obtainable by imposing a rigid structure on negotiations.
21Recall that low ambitions were the norm until fairly recently. Von Mises [26, p. 327], for example,
argued that in bilateral barter scenarios “the ratio of exchange is determined only within broad margins.
[T]heory cannot determine [exactly which] ratio will be established. All that it can assert with regard to
such exchanges is that they can be effected only if each party values what he receives more highly than
what he gives away.” As applied to static bargaining problems, this view remains perfectly defensible.
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